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Cheney v. Bell Nat'l Life: WIDOW
DENIED RECOVERY ON ACCIDENTAL DEAm POUCYWHEN
HUSBAND DIED FROM AIDS
CONTAMINATED TRANSFUSION.
In Cheney v. Bell Nat'l Life, 315 Md.
761, 556 A.2d 1135 (1989), the Coun of
Appeals of Maryland barred an insured
widow's recovery under an accidental
death policy after her husband died of
AIDS (Acquired Immune DefiCiency Syndrome) which he accidentaUycontracted
from a necessary blood transfusion. The
coun held that hemophilia was a "sickness or disease" within the meaning of a
policywbich excluded recovery for death
by "sickness or disease." Id. at 770, 556
A.2d at 1140. Thus, the coun deemed
that accidentally contracting AIDS while
under medical treatment for a sickness or
disease such as hemophilia was not the
type of "accident" contemplated in the
insurance policy.
Petitioner is the surviving spouse of
Anthony Cheney, who suffered from
hemophilia. While undergoing a treatment for hemophilia, Mr. Cheney received a transfusion containing the AIDS
virus. At the age of24, he died of respiratory failure, a direct consequence of the
AIDS virus.
When Mr. Cheney died, he and his wife
jointly held an accidental death policy
under which the insurance company
agreed to pay a designated amount in the
event of the accidental death of either
pany. Upon Mr. Cheney's death, however, the insurance company refused
payment assening that his death was not
"accidental" as defined in the policy.
Cheney, 70 Md. App. at 164-65, 520A.2d
at 403. The policy excluded "any loss
. . . caused by or resulting from . . .
sickness or disease or medical or surgical
treatment therefore (sic) ...." Cheney,
315 Md. at 763, 556A.2d at 1136.
Mrs. Cheney filed suit in the Circuit
Coun for Baltimore City claiming that
her husband's death was accidental.
Judge Elsbeth Bothe granted the insurance company's motion for summary
judgment based on its assenions that Mr.
Cheney'S death resulted from sickness or
disease, or from medical treatment. The
coun of special appeals affirmed, also
suggesting that no "accident" had occurred within the meaning ofthe policy.
Id. at 764, 556 A.2d at 1137.
The coun of appeals began its analysis
by rejecting the insurance company's
contention that coverage was excluded
because death resulted from a sickness or
disease.Id. (relying on General Accounting Co. v. Homely, 109 Md. 93, 99,71 A.

524 (1908». In GeneralAccounting, the
coun of appeals held that where death
resulting from a disease is caused by an
accident, the accident is the true and
predominant cause of death. As a result,
the disease is merely a link in the chain of
causation. Cheney, 315 Md. at 764,556
A.2d at 1137.
The coun of appeals then considered
whether the insured's death resulted
from medical treatment for sickness or
disease. The coun first determined that
the accidental injury occurred when the
contaminated blood was injected into
Mr. Cheney and found unpersuasive Mrs.
Cheney's argument that the accident
occurred when the blood was drawn
from the infected donor. Mrs. Cheney
reasoned that the accident causing death
occurred prior to any medical treatment
for hemophilia. She argued, therefore,
that the exclusion in the policy did not
apply.Id. at 766, 556 A.2d at 1138.
Concluding that death resulted from
the transfusion, namely, from the medical treatment for hemophilia, the coun
was faced with the question of whether
the insured's hemophilia was a "sickness
or disease" within the meaning of the
policy.Id. To determine the meaning of
the policy, the coun looked to the intention of the panies which is ascenained
from the policy as a whole. Under this
construction, words are accorded their
usual, ordinary and accepted meaning,
unless there is evidence to the contrary.
Id. (relying on Pacific Indem. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty, 302 Md. 383, 388,
488 A.2d 486 (1985».
The coun found no ambiguity in the
meaning of the word "disease." The coun
noted that there was no evidence of any
contrary or specific meaning and focused
on the ordinary meaning of the word
"disease." The coun concluded that
hemophilia was a "disease" within its
commonly accepted meaning, and
within the meaning of the insurance
policy under which Mr. Cheney was
covered. Id. at 770, 556A.2d at 1140. Because Mr. Cheney's death resulted from
medical treatment for a disease, Mrs.
Cheney was precluded from receiving
payment under the policy's exclusionary
language.
The coun of appeals concluded that
the cause of Mr. Cheney'S death was an
accidental injury. However, because
hemophilia was a disease within the
meaning ofthe Cheney's insurance policy, the injury (receiving AIDS contaminated blood) was cause by medical treatment for a disease. Therefore, the accident was not covered by the accidental

death policy. Consequently, the coun of
appeals has narrowly construed the
meaning of "accidental" in death policies. As a result, the insurance industry'S
liability under such policies, specifically
with regard to AIDS related death, has
been limited.
----Eugenia Reed Oshrine
State v. Gorman: COURT UPHOLDS
THE USE OF PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES TO STRIKE BlACK
JURORS WHEN mE DEFENDANT IS
WHITE
InState v. Gonnan, 315 Md. 402, 554
A.2d 1203 (1989), the Coun of Appeals
of Maryland held that the state's exercise
of peremptory challenges to strike the
only two black jurors from a jury panel
was constitutionally permissible when
the defendant in question was white.
Gorman, a male caucasian, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Coun for
Harford County of robbery with a deadly
weapon and related offenses. During
voin dire, the prosecution exercised its
perem ptory challenges to strike the only
two black veniremen from the panel.
Gorman was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, pursuant to Maryland's recidivist statute. Id. at 404, 554
A.2d at 1204.
On appeal, Gorman contended that
the state's use of peremptory challenges
to strike the black veniremen from the
panel constituted a denial of equal protection in violation of the founeenth
amendment and a violation of the sixth
amendment's guarantee of an impanial
jury. The coun of special appeals affirmed his conviction. After the coun of
appeals denied ceniorari, the Supreme
Coun of the United States granted Gorman's petition for ceniorari. The SUo
preme Coun vacated the judgment of the
intermediate appellate coun and remanded the case to that coun for reconsideration in light of the recent holding
in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314
(1987). On remand, the coun of special
appeals reversed, and remanded it for a
new trial, relying on Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986), Griffith, and Chew v.
State, 71 Md. App. 681, 527 A.2d 332,
cert. granted, 311 Md. 301, 534A.2d 369
(1987), for its decision. After the coun of
special appeals denied the state's motion
for reconsideration, the coun of appeals
granted both the state's petition and
Gorman's cross petition for writs of
ceniorari. Gonnan, 315 Md. at 404-405,
554 A.2d at 1204. On appeal, the panies
'stipulated that there were only three
issues:
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